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Abstract: Traditionally alarms are designed on the basis of empirical guidelines rather than on a sound 
scientific framework rooted in a theoretical foundation for process and control system design. This paper 
proposes scientific principles and a methodology for design of alarms based on a functional modeling technique 
(MFM) which represents a process in terms of its goals, functions and operating requirements. The reasoning 
capabilities of MFM enable identification of operational situations which threaten to generate an alarm and 
derivation of potential response scenarios. The design methodology can be applied to any engineering system 
which can be modeled by MFM. The methodology provides a set of alarms which can facilitate event 
interpretation and operator support for abnormal situation management. The proposed design methodology 
provides the information content of the alarms, but does not deal with alarm presentation or display design 
issues. A hydraulically powered grinding process is employed as an industrially relevant system to show the 
applicability of the proposed design methodology with promising results. 
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1 Introduction1
Process alarms are used to help operators in coping 
with abnormal situations by alerting and informing 
them in the event of critical operating plant situations. 
According to Abnormal Situation Management 
Consortium (ASM) [1], an abnormal situation is 
defined as ‘a disturbance or series of disturbances in a 
process that cause plant operations to deviate from 
their normal operating state’. An alarm system 
comprises hardware and software components, which 
can signal an alarm state, transmit the signal to the 
process automation system, record the signal, and 
display a message about the signal to the operator [2]. 
Alarm systems are an integrated part of modern 
automation systems, which are used in facilities such 
as nuclear power plants, aircraft cockpits or air traffic 
control stations to call the operators’ attention to 
important events [3]. When a process variable passes a 
limit and/or process equipment is not in a normal state, 
a signal is generated. This signal is commonly called 
an alarm. Alarm designers develop process alarm 
systems assuming that the operator is able to react to 
each alarm and correct the underlying cause. Presently 
alarms are generally designed based on commonly 
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accepted guidelines. In the period when alarms were 
hardwired, the designers tended to design and install 
alarms only when they were really needed because of 
their high cost (approximately 1000$ per alarm) [4]. 
With modern control systems based on advanced ICT 
automation technology, it has become easy and cheap 
to add alarms on any process input or output. 
Consequently too many or irrelevant alarms are often 
defined without careful consideration of their 
importance for operation and consequences for the 
operators workload.  
 
There is accordingly a need for a systematic and 
scientifically based methodology for alarm design. A 
semantically sound generic alarm definition is first 
proposed, and then a functional modeling based 
approach to the analysis of the process states from 
suitable available sensor signals is briefly presented. 
Subsequently four criteria for classification of plant 
situations are defined which will become the basis for 
a situation assessment using the reasoning capabilities 
of the functional models. In addition a methodology 
for state interpretation is presented, before the alarm 
design methodology is given. The modeling and alarm 
design methodology is illustrated on a hydro powered 
flour production system. 
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2. Meanings of alarm and functional 
modeling 
2.1 Definition of alarm 
There are many types of definitions of alarm in the 
literature. Here an alarm is defined based upon the 
following recognition:“An alarm is a signal signifying 
to an operator that an abnormal state has occurred”. 
 
The signal has double significations: 
1) it alerts the operator, arise attention, warn and 
give notice , and 
2) it indicates danger, malfunction, error condition, 
process deviation, and unexpected event 
 
The first signification is on the perceptual level 
whereas the second signification is based on the 
operators’ expectations, experience (i.e. norms) or 
knowledge, and so it is on cognitive level. On this 
basis a new definition of alarm is proposed as:“Alarm 
is a signal which signifies to the operator that an 
abnormal state needs a response.” 
 
Here the term ‘response’ is used to define a required 
reaction. The expression ‘abnormal state’ comprises 
process deviation, error condition, malfunction, and 
neared or overrun limits. The expression ‘abnormal 
state’ must be interpreted in terms of functional 
concepts. For this purpose the following definition is 
applied for ‘abnormal state’ as “An abnormal state is a 
state which threatens or prevents the accomplishment 
of a goal.” 
 
Thus a generic definition of alarm becomes: “An 
alarm is a signal which signifies to the operator that a 
response requiring state threatens or prevents the 
accomplishment of a goal.” 
 
2.2 From abnormal states to functional modeling 
The word ‘normal’ has its roots in the concepts of a 
‘norm’. An abnormal situation is accordingly a 
situation which does not comply with a norm. Norms 
are expressed by criteria for what is good, acceptable, 
desirable or required. They can be derived from 
specifications of how things ought to be, i.e. from an 
intention or purpose. However, norms can also be 
defined by referring to an experienced situation 
representing how things usually are when they are 
acceptable or considered good. In a process life cycle 
perspective these two ways of defining norms are 
connected because a best practice can be transformed 
into requirements and norms. Norms, requirements 
and purposes for action can be represented by 
‘functional modeling’ [5], which provide concepts for 
formalized representation of purposes, goals and 
functions of physical designs. Functional concepts are 
for the same reasons closely connected to concepts of 
failure. It is therefore obvious that functional 
modeling can play a central role for development of a 
scientific basis for alarm design. Previous approaches 
to alarm design have also emphasized the importance 
of functional concepts [6,7], however without 
suggesting the scientific approach as presented in this 
paper. 
 
Larsson [8], Fang and Lind [9] and Gofuku and Tanaka 
[10,11] have used a functional modeling method called 
Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) [12] for fault 
diagnosis and counteraction planning. Those works 
developed principles for reasoning on system failures 
but did neither explicitly consider the problem of 
alarm design nor classified development stages of a 
safety critical situation. 
 
3. Design principles and methodology 
3.1 Semiotics on alarm design and Multilevel Flow 
Modeling  
The design principle of alarms can be built on basic 
principles of sign interpretation from the field of 
semiotics and on a functional modeling method MFM. 
Semiotics studies deal with ‘signs’ and their 
interpretation of any subject from all aspects. In the 
present context the branch of semiotics, which 
originally deals with the interpretation of signs by 
biological organisms, is of particular interest. Morris 
[13] developed a theory of sign interpretation which 
explains how the meaning of signals received by an 
organism interacting with an environment depends on 
the phase of the ‘action’. This theory can be applied to 
alarm interpretation and has been adopted for this 
purpose in combination with functional modeling to 
design of human machine interfaces and to intelligent 
control [12, 14]. 
 
MFM is a modeling methodology which has been 
developed to support functional modeling of process 
plants involving the interactions of materials, energy 
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and information flows [6,7]. Functions are here 
represented by elementary flow functions 
interconnected to form ‘flow structures’ representing a 
particular ‘goal’ oriented perspective of the system. 
MFM is founded on fundamental concepts of action 
[15] and each of the elementary flow functions can thus 
be seen as ‘instances’ of more generic action types [6]. 
The perspectives represented by the flow structures 
are related by ‘means-end relations’ and comprise 
together a comprehensive model of the functional 
organization of the system. The basic modeling 
concepts of MFM include objectives, flow structures, 
as set of ‘functional primitives’ (the flow functions 
with causal roles) and a set of means-end relations 
representing purpose related dependencies between 
flow structures. The functions, the flow structures and 
the ‘relations’ are interconnected to form a 
hyper-graph like structure.  
 
3.2 Example: an overshot water mill 
An overshot water mill shown in Fig. 1 is used as an 
example of process system to illustrate the principles 
and the methodology for alarm design. A water mill 
uses a water wheel to drive a mechanical process for 
flour or lumber production. The water used by the mill 
is diverted from a river along a channel known as the 
flume. A sluice gate on the flume is used to control the 
amount of water flowing into the mill. The wheel is 
rotated by the falling water striking and filling the 
buckets of the wheel, making it heavier than the other 
empty side. The weight turns the wheel which in turn 
rotates the drive shaft with a toothed wheel. By means 
of the horizontal toothed wheel, the angle of rotation 
changes which in turn rotates the spindle and drives a 
runner stone. The runner stone is the upper part of the 
millstones which spins above the stationary bed stone 
creating the grinding action. The runner stone has a 
hole near the centre into which the grain is fed. The 
grain is ground between these two stones, moves 
through to the outer edge and passes as flour through 
the casing. By means of the grinding action, the shells 
and the flour are separated. Two intervention 
possibilities are assumed to be available to the miller 
in this kind of system: (i) changing the water flow rate 
to the water wheel by means of the sluice rate, and (ii) 
manipulating the feed rate of the grain to the runner 
stone. 
 
3.3 MFM model of a water mill 
The process alarm design is based on the MFM model 
of the water mill as shown in Fig. 2. The main skeleton 
of an MFM model is its “objective tree”. Figure 3 
shows the objective tree of the example MFM model. 
The flow structure S3 as shown both in Figs. 2 and 3 
represents the functions involved in supplying water 
to the water wheel, where the water is transported 
through the sluice (represented by tr7) into the buckets 
(represented as a sink si4). 
 
When the water flow is achieved then O3 is fulfilled 
and the water wheel is moving. Thus (following the 
“producer-product relation” connecting S3 with so2) 
the energy in the water is converted to rotational 
energy represented by the flow functions so2, tr4 and 
si3. Furthermore, when O2 is achieved rotational 
energy is available for the grinding, which is 
represented by the flow function bl1 in the grain 
structure S1. The supply of grain is represented by 
source so1 and the transport tr1 and the flour produced 
is transported to the consumer (si2).  
 
The fulfillment of main objective (O1) depends on the 
fulfillment of all other objectives. The objective O3 is 
independent while O2 depends on O3. The objective 
tree as shown schematically in Fig. 4 is a hierarchy. In 
general however it may be a heterarchy with multiple 
top goals and sub-goals. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The overshot water mill. 
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Fig. 2 A simple MFM model for the overshot water mill. 
 
 
 
Fig.3 The objective tree for the water mill. 
 
3.4 Flow function circumstances 
To enable reasoning for state assessment it is suitable 
to define four ‘condition types’ related to the flow 
functions. The first two are originally proposed by 
Paasen and Wieringa [16] and Petersen [12], and they are 
the enabling and establishing circumstances which 
relate to normal operation. The other two are related to 
abnormal operation: abnormal and failed 
circumstances. 
 
3.4.1 Enabling circumstances 
Enabling circumstances enable flow functions in the 
flow structures. A flow function is enabled when it has 
the full potential to contribute to the achievement of its 
corresponding objective. When a flow function is 
enabled, it is however not yet interacting with its 
adjacent flow functions. Consequently, the flow 
functions in the corresponding flow structures are not 
yet integrated to be able to achieve their corresponding 
objectives. Figure 4 demonstrates the enabled 
functions in the corresponding flow structures. Certain 
system circumstances must be present for each flow 
function to be enabled. The set of circumstances 
which enables the flow functions are labeled as Nnxy 
for x = flow function type (source: so, sink: si, 
transport: tr, barrier: ba, storage: st, balance: bl), y = 
function number (1, 2, 3...) and n = condition number 
(1, 2, 3…). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 MFM model of water mill with flow functions enabled 
 
3.4.2 Establishing circumstances  
A flow function is established when its state supports 
and ensures the achievement of its corresponding 
objective [16]. When a flow function is established, it is 
interacting with its adjacent flow functions. 
Accordingly, a flow structure is established when its 
flow functions are connected. As can be seen from Fig. 
5, in this state, the flow functions are connected, and 
the MFM relations and the objectives are fulfilled. The 
set of circumstances which establish the flow 
functions is labeled as Snxy in analogy with the 
enabling circumstances. When flow functions are 
established, they are interacting and dependent of their 
adjacent functions and MFM relations. 
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Fig. 5 MFM model of water mill with flow functions enabled 
and established. Additionally a specific threat is also shown 
with flow functions in gray. 
 
3.4.3 Disturbing circumstances 
A flow function is disturbed when its state may 
threaten the achievement of its corresponding 
objective. When a flow function is disturbed, it has the 
potential to disturb its adjacent flow functions. 
Accordingly, it can disturb the integration of the flow 
functions in the flow structure. This will threaten the 
achievement of the corresponding objective. Such 
disturbing system circumstances are called ‘threats’. 
The set of abnormal system circumstances which 
disturbs the flow functions are labeled as Tnxy. For 
example T1so1 represents one of the disturbing 
circumstances in the set of circumstances which 
disturb the source function so1. In Fig. 5, the effect of 
a disturbing condition on the source function so1 
(T1so1) in the flow structure S1 is illustrated. When 
T1so1 occurs, it disturbs the source function so1 and its 
relation to the adjacent flow function tr1 (dotted lines). 
When so1 is disturbed, it has the potential to disturb its 
adjacent flow functions tr1, bl1, tr2, si1, tr3, si2 and 
their MFM relations (both grey). If the integration of 
the flow functions is disturbed, the state of so1 will 
threaten the achievement of its corresponding 
objective O1 (shown in grey). A threat occurs when a 
flow function is threatened to be brought outside of the 
intentional operation limits. For every Tnxy, the 
corresponding threat type must be identified. A given 
threat T1so1 can cause the source function so1 to be 
outside its state constraint. Rossig, et al., presents a 
methodology for identification of threats in HAZOP 
studies [17, 18]. 
 
3.4.4 Disabling circumstances 
A flow function is disabled when its state immediately 
threatens and may prevent the achievement of its 
corresponding objective. When a flow function is 
disabled, it disturbs its adjacent flow functions, 
relations and the integration of flow functions. 
Consequently, it immediately threatens the 
achievement of the corresponding objective. 
Moreover, it has also the potential to disable its 
adjacent flow functions and relations. Accordingly, if 
it starts to disable its adjacent flow functions, it will 
also disable the integration of the flow functions in the 
corresponding flow structure. This will prevent the 
achievement of the corresponding objective. Such 
disabling circumstances are called ‘failures’. The set 
of abnormal system circumstances which disables the 
flow functions as Fnxy in the MFM model as shown in 
Fig.6,  where F1so2, represents one of the disabling 
circumstances (for so2) in the set of circumstances 
which disable the source function so2. When F1so2 
occurs, it will disable so2 and its relation to the 
adjacent flow function tr4. This is shown by the 
double lines ‘//’ on so2 in Fig. 6. When so2 is disabled, 
it immediately disturbs and may disable all the 
adjacent functions and MFM relations in S2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 MFM model of water mill showing the effect of F1so2 on 
the enabled and established MFM model. The flow functions 
which are disturbed by the failure are painted black. 
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The flow functions disturbed by Fso2 are painted black 
and the disturbed MFM relations are shown by dotted 
lines. Since the integration of the flow functions in S2 
is disturbed, Fso2 immediately threatens the 
achievement of the corresponding objective O2. Since 
O2 is threatened and si3 influences bl1 (through a 
producer-product relation), it will disturb the 
integration of the flow functions in S1 which will also 
threaten the achievement of O1. In Fig. 6, the 
threatened and potentially prevented objectives and all 
the disturbed and potentially disabled flow functions 
are painted black. The disturbed and potentially 
disabled MFM relations are shown by dotted lines. 
The impact of Fnxy on a flow function depends on the 
type of the flow function and the nature of the 
disabling condition. 
 
3.5 Signals and their interpretations 
When abnormal states occur, they can threaten or 
prevent the accomplishment of the system goal. Thus, 
an agent must perceive and interpret these abnormal 
circumstances to recommend intervention. The 
supervisory control agent assesses the state of the 
system caused by events in order to produce or 
maintain the state of affairs according to the available 
system information, goals and possible courses of 
action[14]. In Fig.7, the signal generation by an event, 
the perception of these signals by the agent, the 
interpretation process and the possible intervention are 
illustrated. 
 
 
 
Fig.7 Interpretation of event signals and consequential 
intervention.  
 
In the principles of alarm design, the interpretation 
consists of three consecutive phases. The agent 
perceives signals from the system and the 
environment. The perceived signals are classified into 
four types of circumstances (N-enabling, 
S-establishing, T-disturbing, F-disabling) for each 
flow function in the MFM model. This is the first 
phase of interpretation shown in Fig.7. In the second 
phase of interpretation, the state of the main function 
of each objective is investigated. The main functions 
are the focal points for the interpretation of abnormal 
states within the flow structures in Phase-2. For 
example, in the water mill MFM model (Fig.3), the 
main functions are (in red circles) tr3, si3 and tr8. 
 
In Phase-2, the success of the interpretation process is 
directly dependent on the agent’s reasoning ability, 
capacity and knowledge about the system. In complex 
systems, the agent may have many events to perceive 
and interpret. Thus automatic reasoning support is 
essential when the control agent is a human operator. 
 
After the state of each objective in a given MFM 
model is known, the third interpretation phase is 
completed with respect to the main goal in the MFM 
model. In this phase, the state of the goal (the main 
objective e.g. O1 in Fig.2) is investigated by its 
corresponding main function. The potential inter flow 
structure propagations can be derived by reasoning 
about the means-end relations in the model (e.g. 
condition and producer-product relations).  
 
4 Alarm Design  
An alarm “signifies a response requiring state which 
threatens or prevents the accomplishment of a goal of 
a purposeful system”. Thus the circumstances 
confirmed during interpretation as corresponding to 
objective ‘will be under threat’, ‘is under threat’, ‘will 
fail’ or ‘is failed’ are considered as alarms, as listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Notation for alarm types  
related to goal Oi (i = 1, 2, 3…). 
 
 
 
In modern control system alarms are generally 
classified in categories such as message or warning, 
alarm and emergency, depending on the time available 
for operator intervention before automatic action takes 
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over. The categories “will be under threat” and “under 
threat” used in Table 1 corresponds to ‘alarm’, while 
the categories “will fail” and “failed” corresponds to 
‘emergency’. 
 
The full propagation potential (from so3 in S3 to st1 in 
S1) of Tso3:lovol is shown in Fig.8. As seen in the 
potential propagation path in Fig.8, there are three 
intervention possibilities labeled as C3, C2 and C1 
which mediates si3, so2 and tr1, respectively. 
 
 
 
Fig.8 Propagation of an abnormal condition Tso3: lovol with 
three intervention possibilities. Alarm types are shown on the 
right hand side while intervention possibilities C1, C2 and C3. 
 
The above methodology leads to a procedure and set 
of rules for reasoning based alarm generation and 
suggested intervention generation. On this basis the 
systematic alarm design procedure will be 
summarized as below: 
(1) Develop a Multilevel Flow Modeling (MFM) of 
the given process including explanation of 
objectives, causal relations and, description of 
flow functions, 
(2) Identify the objective tree (heterarchy) from the 
MFM model, 
(3) Identify enabling-N and establishing-S 
circumstances for each MFM flow function and 
structure, 
(4) Identify disturbing-T and disabling-F 
circumstances for each MFM flow function and 
structure, 
(5) Identify the main function for each objective 
concerning the means-end relations, 
(6) Identify possible intervention possibilities 
together with their descriptions, 
(7) Identify fixed alarm contents for every objective, 
(8) Identify the criticality of the given system, 
through consequence propagation in dependence 
of the prediction horizon, and 
(9) Apply the procedures and rules for alarm 
generation following the alarm design principles. 
 
Throughout this paper the water mill has been used as 
illustrative example. By using the methods presented 
above the alarms for every objective also has been 
identified. These alarms contain the information 
contents for any alarm generated during the 
interpretation process. The results are most reasonable. 
The state of the flow functions in the model is easily 
identified. These alarm design principles also have 
been investigated on a more realistic industrially 
inspired example, i.e. an industrial heat pump on a 
distillation column. The investigation also in this case 
produced most promising results.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The principles and methodology given in this paper 
enable an engineer to approach a systematic alarm 
design upon a scientific basis. The alarm design 
methodology proposed in this paper can be applied to 
any engineering system which can be consistently 
modeled by MFM. The most crucial aspect of the 
methodology is the interpretation procedure which is 
performed by the alarm system to support an operator. 
This interpretation exploits the reasoning capabilities 
of the MFM models. Several rules can be applied to 
predict the propagation of disturbing circumstances on 
a given path by using causal relations [12].  By the 
reasoning system the propagation of abnormal 
circumstances can be qualitatively predicted and 
classified by the proposed alarm design. Moreover, to 
deal with branching propagation paths, additional 
rules can be designed for the interpretation process. 
This alarm design methodology can form an improved 
basis for diagnosis and counteraction planning [8-10,12]. 
 
Changing the alarm sensitivity in an abnormal 
situation can be used for ‘alarm suppression’. When 
many alarms are presented to the operator, the alarm 
sensitivity can be decreased to reveal the overall 
situation in the plant. That will eventually decrease the 
number of alarms. In addition, by increasing the alarm 
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sensitivity, an operator can obtain an idea of how far 
the present abnormal situation can propagate. 
 
While developing the alarm design principles, it was 
assumed that the state of each flow function could be 
identified. The larger the number of flow function 
states which can be identified, the more reliable the 
interpretation becomes. As illustrated in both cases 
and especially in the heat pump case, in engineering 
systems it is not economically practical to measure the 
state of each flow function. 
 
On the other hand, the qualitative reasoning 
capabilities of MFM will reduce the need for 
measuring the state of all flow functions. However 
qualitative reasoning will have a limitation that the 
alarms are more uncertain when measurements are 
located far (in terms of propagation path) from the root 
cause. For highly safety critical cases quantitative 
mathematical models may be combined with MFM to 
predict the states of observable critical flow functions, 
when necessary. 
 
The MFM modeling enables a qualitative 
representation of a system on several levels of 
means-end abstraction. When large industrial systems 
such as oil refineries and power plants are considered, 
a network of objectives for these systems can be 
developed. Thereafter MFM models can be developed 
for each objective in the network. Next, specific 
alarms can be designed for each objective. By this 
method, the proposed alarm design principles can be 
used systematically at different abstraction levels. 
This will enable the operators to cope efficiently with 
critical abnormal situations affecting the overall 
operation of large industrial plants or system 
networks. 
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